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Neoclassical economic theory assumes that when agents tackle dynamic decisions un-
der ambiguity, preferences are represented by Expected Utility and prior beliefs are up-
dated according to Bayes rule, upon the arrival of partial information. Nevertheless, when
one considers non-neutral ambiguity attitudes, either the axiom of dynamic consistency or of
consequentialism should be relaxed. We report the results of a new experiment, designed to
investigate how people behave in a dynamic choice problem under ambiguity, where deci-
sions are made both before and after the resolution of some uncertainty. We study which of
the two rationality axioms people violate, along with the question of whether this violation
is part of a conscious planning strategy or not. The combination of the two, allows us to
classify subjects to three behavioural types: resolute, naı¨ve and sophisticated. Using data
from a portfolio choice experiment where ambiguity is represented in a transparent and
non-manipulable way, we cannot reject the hypothesis of Bayesian updating for half of our
experimental population. For ambiguity non-neutral subjects, we find that the majority are
sophisticated, a few are naı¨ve and few are resolute.
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1 Introduction
Underlying much of economic theory are three key assumptions. These are that economic
agents: (1) use probabilities to describe risky and ambiguous situations; (2) behave in a dynam-
ically consistent way; and (3) update probabilities according to Bayes rule, upon the arrival of
partial information. Subjective Expected Utility theory (SEU, Savage (1954)) binds these three
assumptions together in a logically and intellectually satisfying manner. Nevertheless, since
the seminal thought experiments proposed by Ellsberg (1961), challenging the first assump-
tion, a vast literature of theoretical models emerged, aiming to accommodate Ellsberg-type
preferences1. The direct consequence of this, was the rapid development of a large body of
experimental work, that either tests the attitudes towards ambiguity or performs horse-race
comparisons to identify the model that best describes data2.
However, as it is highlighted in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993), if one wants to confirm
the theoretical validity of any model of decision making under uncertainty, this model should
be able to successfully cope with the dynamic aspect of the choices. When SEU is extended
to its dynamic dimension, the independence axiom (often called the “sure thing principle”)
is equivalent to two rationality axioms, namely dynamic consistency (DC) and consequentialism
(C), along with other conventional assumptions. DC requires that the ex-ante preferences coin-
cide with the ex-post ones, while C dictates that past decisions play no role and only available
options matter3. Ghirardato (2002), provides the elegant result that when both DC and C are
satisfied, preferences are represented by SEU and the agent’s beliefs are updated according to
Bayes rule4. However, given that most of the non-SEU models relax the independence axiom,
modelling dynamic choice requires the theoretician to abandon either DC or C and conse-
quently, to abandon Bayes rule. Al-Najjar and Weistein (2009) classify the literature into four
broad categories, dealing with inconsistencies in dynamic choice, namely naı¨vete´, sophistica-
tion, distortion of updating rules and restriction of information structures, where in almost all
cases one of the two axioms is relaxed5.
1See among others Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Schmeidler (1989), Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Ghirardato
et al. (2004), Klibanoff et al. (2005), Maccheroni et al. (2006), Gajdos et al. (2008), Siniscalchi (2009). For an extensive
review of the models see Etner et al. (2012).
2See Halevy (2007), Hayashi and Wada (2010), Hey et al. (2010), Abdellaoui et al. (2011), Charness et al. (2013),
Hey and Pace (2014), Ahn et al. (2014), Stahl (2014), Baillon and Bleichrodt (2015). Trautmann and van de Kuilen
(2015).
3Consequentialism was first proposed in Hammond (1988) and it requires that the conditional preferences to
remain unaffected by the outcomes outside the conditional events. Representing the dynamic problem with a
decision tree, consequentialism is satisfied when the decision maker (DM) does not take into account states that are
not available anymore and thinks of the rest of the decision tree as being a new problem.
4Klibanoff and Hanany (2007) claim that dynamic consistency is the primary justification for Bayesian updating
and under the view that Bayesian updating should be taken as given, DC comes “for free” under Expected Utility.
5We briefly expand on these notions in section 2.
2
Even though there exist plenty of experimental studies that report extensive deviations
from Bayesian updating (El-Gamal (1995), Charness and Levin (2005), Charness et al. (2007),
Holt and Smith (2009)), all focus on choice in risky environments (existence of objective proba-
bilities) and their results are usually based on the conventional assumption of risk neutrality. In
a recent study by Antoniou et al. (2015), where the authors investigate how accounting for risk
attitudes alters inferences on deviations from Bayes rule, they conclude that “Previous anal-
yses of subjective Bayesian decision-making, including our own here, have assumed that the
subject is neutral towards the uncertainty that is involved in the use of an inferred posterior
probability. To address this hypothesis one would need theoretical, experimental and econo-
metric extensions of our approach”. In the present study we apply the extensions indicated
in Antoniou et al. (2015) so that we can test for deviations from Bayes rule, when the DMs
are characterised by non-neutral ambiguity attitudes and have non-SEU preferences. Our gen-
eral aim is to provide insights on how people behave in a dynamic decision problem under
ambiguity and decisions are made before and after the resolution of some uncertainty. De-
composing the above idea and using an experimental design (a portfolio choice problem) that
diverges from the traditional Ellsberg-urn type experiments, we aspire to investigate three
main questions. First, do people behave according to the predictions of the SEU model and
therefore, update beliefs in a Bayesian way? Second, when people deviate from SEU, which of
the two rationality axioms do they violate? Third, when subjects violate the axioms of SEU, are
they aware of this violation? In other words, is this violation the consequence of a conscious
planning strategy? To address the first question, we propose a new experimental design that
allows to directly test for violations of the SEU model. Regarding the second question, there is
already evidence of extensive violation of DC (Dominiak et al. (2012)), in the framework of the
dynamic Ellsberg urn6. We provide new evidence of violation of the two axioms, using alterna-
tive decision tasks and ways to represent ambiguity in the lab. Furthermore, previous studies
of dynamic choice under ambiguity were constrained in answering whether subjects violate
DC or C. Although this distinction is useful to inform theory and provide future directions, it
does not clarify whether divergence from SEU is intended or not. We extend this analysis and
test if this violation is part of the subjects’ planning strategy by assuming three behavioural
types, the resolute, the naı¨ve and the sophisticated. We assume a particular model of decision
making under ambiguity, the α-Maxmin Expected Utility preferences (α-MEU, Ghirardato et al.
(2004)) and by making appropriate assumptions, we fit preference functionals to our data and
6To save space, we do not describe the dynamic Ellsberg urn problem here. The interested reader can consult
Epstein and Schneider (2003), Klibanoff and Hanany (2007) and Dominiak et al. (2012). An illustration of this
extension is also provided in the supplementary material.
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compare decisions to the predictions of the SEU model that we use as a benchmark. Moreover,
we further investigate issues that studies of static choice under ambiguity usually focus on (i.e.
ambiguity attitudes and correlation between risk and ambiguity attitudes). Overall, we find
substantial heterogeneity in behaviour. Almost half of our experimental population behaves
according to SEU. For the ambiguity non-neutral subjects, the majority are best described by
the sophisticated type, few by the naı¨ve and the remaining by the resolute. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study that experimentally investigates dynamic decision making
under ambiguity in a portfolio choice experiment and considers behavioural heterogeneity in
planning strategies.
2 Relevant Literature
Al-Najjar and Weistein (2009), classify theories to four different categories, depending the as-
sumptions they make on how DMs tackle dynamic problems and update their beliefs upon the
reception of partial information. The first category includes theories that abandon DC and are
labeled as “naı¨ve updating” theories since it is not necessary for the decisions at the present to
take into consideration future preferences. This includes Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993), Pires
(2002), Wang (2003), Eichberger et al. (2007) and Eichberger et al. (2010)7. In this approach,
each of the stages is faced independently of the other, strategy that may lead to dynamic in-
consistencies and dominated results. The second category, includes theories that require the
DM to behave in a sophisticated way, violating DC This approach is mainly represented by
Siniscalchi (2011), who does not assume any particular preference functional or update rule.
The idea is based on the notion of consistent planning, where the ex-post preferences are taken
into account when the ex-ante choices are made. An alternative way to model dynamic choice,
involves the relaxation of C. This family of models proposes the use of a set of distorting updat-
ing rules that ensure DC. This includes Klibanoff and Hanany (2007), Hanany and Klibanoff
(2009) and Klibanoff et al. (2009), who have axiomatised and extended few of the most com-
monly used ambiguity models to their dynamic version. Finally, there is a category of models
in the literature that maintains both C and DC in the framework of multiple-priors represen-
tation of beliefs. To this end, these models require the restriction of information sets and allow
the updating only of the set of beliefs that do not reverse the ex-ante choices based on the
rectangularity condition. A representative model of this approach is presented in Epstein and
Schneider (2003)8.
7Ozdenoren and Peck (2008) in a game theoretical framework, show that violating DC is the rational course of
action, when suspicion is perceived regarding the composition of the Ellsberg urn.
8An exhaustive review of the theoretical literature is beyond the scope of this study. Al-Najjar and Weistein
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Early experimental evidence on violations of DC in a risky framework includes Tversky
and Kahneman (1981), Cubitt et al. (1998), Busemeyer et al. (2000) and Nebout and Dubois
(2014). More recently, Hey and Panaccione (2011) and Nebout and Willinger (2014), categorise
their subjects to behavioural types according to the planning strategies and the axioms they
satisfy when they tackle dynamic problems9. As far as ambiguity is concerned, although there
is a rich experimental literature on static ambiguity preferences, this is not the case when one
considers dynamic choice and updating where the literature is surpisingly limited. Our work
is closer to the studies by Cohen et al. (2000), Dominiak et al. (2012) and Corgnet et al. (2013),
which all focus on dynamic choice under ambiguity. Cohen et al. (2000) study the descriptive
validity of the main two updating rules that have been axiomatised for the multiple-priors fam-
ily, the Maximum Likelihood Updating (MLU) rule and the Full Bayesian Updating (FBU) rule10.
Using a design based on the dynamic Ellsberg urn, they confirm the Ellsberg type behaviour
and show that the FBU rule is applied more often. They assume separability (an assumption
close to C), fact that does not allow for a direct test of which axiom subjects satisfy. In addition,
the experiment was not incentivised in monetary terms. Dominiak et al. (2012), use a similar
design as in Cohen et al. (2000). They test whether subjects satisfy DC or C, providing evidence
of extensive violation of C and they also find supporting evidence for the FBU rule. Finally,
Corgnet et al. (2013) study trader reaction to ambiguity when dividend information is sequen-
tially revealed in an experimental asset market. They find that the role of ambiguity cannot
explain financial anomalies.
The experiment we report here differs from the aforementioned studies in various ways.
Both Cohen et al. (2000) and Dominiak et al. (2012) use the same experimental design, while we
use a dynamic portfolio task along with an alternative device to represent ambiguity (a Bingo
Blower) in a way that can potentially generate less suspicion vis-a`-vis the Ellsberg urn (see
Charness et al. (2013, p. 3), Ozdenoren and Peck (2008)). Furthermore, in the previous studies,
the inference is based on a constrained set of four pairwise choice questions per participant.
In order to eliminate possible confusion, but also to estimate preference functionals, we ask
our participants a large set of allocation questions that allows us to gather potentially more
informative data, since the choice variable now is continuous rather than binary ((Loomes and
Pogrebna, 2014)). An additional aspect of our study is that we do not constraint the analysis
to the question of which axiom is violated by ambiguity non-neutral agents, but instead, we
estimate structural ambiguity models which permit the identification of various behavioural
(2009), Klibanoff et al. (2009) and Siniscalchi (2011), provide excellent reviews of the various approaches on mod-
elling dynamic preferences under ambiguity.
9For an overview see Hammond and Zank (2014).
10We present the two update rules in Section 4.
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types regarding their planning strategies. In other words, we do not only test for violations of
DC, but we extend the analysis and try to understand whether subjects are aware of this viola-
tion and take it into consideration when they make choices. We also account for the stochastic
part of decision making, allowing for heterogeneity in choices within subjects by adopting an
appropriate error story. Finally, Corgnet et al. (2013), focus on experimental asset markets and
are interested in aggregated decisions while we are interested in behaviour at the individual
level and the heterogeneity in choices between the participants. Moreover they do not test any
particular decision model or updating rule neither do they take into consideration heterogene-
ity in planning strategies. To summarise, our study contributes to the ambiguity literature and
more specifically, to the literature of dynamic choice under ambiguity and updating of am-
biguous beliefs. Using a new experimental design that diverges from the standard Ellsberg
urn, and asking subjects a series of portfolio allocations, we provide new evidence of violation
of SEU and Bayesian updating.
3 The Experimental Design and the Portfolio Choice Problem
In this paper we use experimental data to estimate models of decision making under ambi-
guity in a dynamic framework. We need to jointly elicit risk and ambiguity attitudes of the
participants, as well as subjective probabilities (beliefs). In the literature there have been pro-
posed various ways to elicit and measure subjective beliefs (scoring rules, matching probabili-
ties, stated beliefs) which either require several assumptions regarding the risk attitudes of the
DM or are difficult to explain to subjects. Instead, we elicit beliefs and strategies based on a
revealed preference argument. To achieve this, we ask our subjects a series of 2-stage portfolio
allocation questions, an experimental design inspired by Loomes (1991), who used allocation
type questions and simply asked subjects to allocate experimental income between two risky
alternatives. This allocation procedure, seems to provide more informative data, and it has
been generally applied to the literature in various contexts11. Using allocation data allows
us to parametrically estimate latent specifications of theoretical decision making models and
to further test for deviations from Bayesian updating, as well as for the existence of different
planning strategies.
Our design shares similarities with Ahn et al. (2014) and extends it in two ways. We use
11Studies that use allocation problems include Choi et al. (2007) in a portfolio choice experiment under risk, Char-
ness and Gneezy (2010) studying portfolio choices, Hey and Panaccione (2011) on dynamic decision making under
risk, Ahn et al. (2014) in a portfolio choice experiment under ambiguity, Hey and Pace (2014) comparing different
static models of choice under ambiguity and Loomes and Pogrebna (2014) studying individual risk attitudes. See
Loomes and Pogrebna (2014) for an extensive discussion on the allocation procedure.
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a simple two-stage portfolio allocation task, with three possible states of nature. At each state
s, corresponds a state-contingent Arrow security, the return of which equals es if state s occurs
and 0 otherwise, where es is the rate of return of asset s (henceforth exchange rate) for every
unit of income allocated to this asset. Contrary to Ahn et al. (2014) who represent ambiguity
using the 3-colour Ellsberg urn, we are representing ambiguity with the aid of a transparent
and non-manipulable device, a Bingo Blower12. The Bingo Blower consists of a transparent
box that contains colourful table tennis balls. At the bottom of the box, there is a motor that
generates a stream of air, which makes the balls to continuously move inside the box. The
advantage of this device, is that when the number of the balls is sufficiently high, one is not
able to count their exact number, distinguishing this environment from one with objective
probabilities. What is possible to do, is to distinguish that there is at least one ball of each
colour (lower bound probabilities) and to obtain a rough idea of the maximum number of the
balls (upper bound) preserving always some ambiguity.13 In other words, while there exist
objective probabilities (known only to the experimenter), the subjects are not able to precisely
construct an objective probability distribution. Inside the Bingo Blower there are balls of three
different colours blue (B), red (R) and yellow (Y), to represent the three different Arrow assets.
The use of the Bingo Blower helps us avoid two main drawbacks of the Ellsberg urn. The first,
as was mentioned earlier, is related to the suspicion that the subjects raise regarding the actual
composition of the urn. Another important drawback, as is explained in Ahn et al. (2014, p.
209), is that in this particular framework, it is not possible to identify the ambiguity attitude
parameter separately from the set of priors. As we are interested in both the attitude an the
set of priors, using three ambiguous states rather two permits, as we explain later, the joint
identification of the parameters.
The most important difference with Ahn et al. (2014) is that we extend this framework to
its dynamic version. At time t = 0, an agent is endowed with experimental income m and is
asked to allocate it between the three assets, given the vector of exchange rates e and satisfying
the budget constraint. The demand for the assets is a function of the preferences of the DM,
the exchange rates, the available income and the beliefs of the DM. At t = 1, nature moves and
a state of the world is realised (a ball is drawn from the Bingo Blower). At this point, the actual
state of the world is not yet revealed to the subject. Instead, partial information is provided
to the agent that one of the states of the world has not occurred in the form “the ball is not
s”. The DM is consequently loosing the proportion of the income that has been allocated to
12A similar Bingo cage has been used by Andersen et al. (2012) and the Bingo Blower has been used by Hey et al.
(2010) and Hey and Pace (2014), all in static choice problems.
13Roughly, when the number of balls is more than 10, the environment becomes ambiguous enough, otherwise it
is possible that subjects might be able to count the exact number of balls, transforming the problem to a risky one.
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that state and at the second stage, she is asked to allocate the remaining experimental income
to the two available assets based on her preferences, the exchange rates and her now updated
beliefs. At t = 2, all ambiguity is resolved, the actual state of the world is revealed and the DM
is paid the state-contingent dividend. We ask our subjects a series of 60 two-stage allocation
questions, where an allocation question consists of an amount m of experimental income and
a vector e containing the exchange rates for the three assets. Every question involves different
levels of income and exchange rates. During the experiment, the draws from the Bingo Blower
were hypothetical14 for the simple reason that we wanted to focus purely on updating15. Al-
lowing continuous sampling from the Bingo Blower, could potentially generate learning effects
regarding the actual probability distribution, that would transform the problem to a risky one
(objective probabilities)16. A drawback of this experimental design is that we need to assume
that the subjects are either risk averse or risk neutral. A risk neutral person would allocate ev-
erything to the asset with the highest expected payoff whereas, a risk seeking person, would
be willing to allocate negative amounts to some of the assets17. As a result, it is not possible
to distinguish behaviour between a risk seeking and a risk neutral subject. Nevertheless, the
analysis shows that the number of seeking or neutral subjects was very limited.18
4 Theoretical Framework and the Different Types
In this section we present the latent structural models of decision making that we fit to our
data, as well as the various behavioural types of DMs that we assume. First we provide few
definitions needed to characterise the different types, namely dynamic consistency, consequen-
tialism and consistent planning.
Dynamic Consistency. An agent satisfies dynamic consistency (DC) whenever her ex-ante choices
coincide with her ex-post.
While in a pairwise choice context, DC dictates the lack of reversals, in the allocation con-
14This form of hypothetical signals has been previously applied in the literature in Griffin and Tversky (1992)
and Kraemer and Weber (2004).
15To generate the appropriate signals, we adopted the following procedure. The software was programmed to
perform i.i.d. draws for every allocation problem, based on the actual probability distribution of balls inside the
Bingo Blower. For each problem a virtual ball was drawn. Imagine, that for a given problem, this ball is red. Then,
a signal was sent to the participants, where with probability p=0.5 they were informed that the ball is not yellow,
otherwise they received the signal that the ball is not blue. To ensure credibility, the virtual draw did not define the
winning colour of the experiment. We return to this point in section 5.
16See for example Trautmann and Zeckhauser (2013), Ert and Trautmann (2014) and Baillon et al. (2015)
17Allowing subjects to do so, would require to consider negative payoffs, something that we would like to skip
at this point and investigate in future research.
18Gneezy et al. (2015) have recently designed an experiment that allows joint estimation of risk and ambiguity
attitudes and allows for risk seeking behaviour. Their results confirm that a large proportion of subjects can be
characterised as risk averse.
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text, we need to slightly adapt this definition. Let u : R → R a standard von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function, that satisfies the usual assumptions of being twice differentiable,
strictly increasing and strictly concave and X a non-negative portfolio allocation X = (xR, xB, xY.
Then DC should guarantee that the unconditional marginal rate of substitution between two as-
sets (e.g. R and B) is equal to the conditional one, given the information that Y has not hap-







Consequentialism. An agent satisfies consequentialism (C) when her preferences conditional on a
non-null event E are not affected by the outcomes outside the conditional event.
More specifically, this axiom requires that no weight is placed on the consequences of acts
that are not available any more and the conditional preferences depend only on the infor-
mation provided by the conditioning event E20. It naturally follows that an ambiguity non-
neutral, consequentialist DM will not always satisfy Equation 1. Finally, the last definition is
needed for the DMs who although violate DC, they are aware of this violation. It is based on
the notion of consistent planning, first introduced in Strotz (1955-56) in the context of determin-
istic dynamic choice.
Consistent Planning. An agent adopts the consistent planning (CP) strategy, if at each decision node,
the best plan among those that will be actually followed is chosen.
This concept borrows elements from the game theoretical literature, where the dynamic
problem is represented by a game played by multiple selves of the same individual. The DM
applies backward induction and her planning strategy requires to first consider the terminal
choice node of a decision tree and choose the optimal course of action at this point. Then, by
“folding back”, she calculates the optimal choice in the previous nodes, taking into consider-
ation her future preferences. Siniscalchi (2011) formally axiomatises this concept for dynamic
choice under ambiguity by deriving ex-ante conditional preferences over decision trees rather
than over acts21. We next derive the behaviour for each of the specifications that we consider.
We start by presenting the benchmark model of SEU with Bayesian updating and then, we
subsequently relax the assumption of ambiguity neutral attitudes. We present the strategies
assuming a generic form regarding the utility representation22.
19It is easy to show that Bayesian updating requires Equation 1 to be satisfied.
20Al-Najjar and Weistein (2009) refer to this type of updated preferences as fact-based updated preferences.
21We expand on this notion in Section 4.4.3.
22Since the problem is restricted to a 2-period model, it is possible to obtain solutions in a closed form. In the
supplementary material, we provide the analytical solutions we used for the analysis, for all the specifications.
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4.1 Subjective Expected Utility
The DM is assumed to hold a unique set of subjective, additive priors pi = {pi(R),pi(B),pi(Y)}
regarding the three possible states of the world such that pi(R) +pi(B) +pi(Y) = 1. As already
highlighted, a convenient feature of the SEU model is that the DM satisfies both DC and C and
consequently, the beliefs of the agent are updated according to the Bayes rule which ensures
that the ex-ante allocation coincides with the ex-post. Hence, it suffices to solve the problem as
if it was a static one with three possible states of the world. Assuming a utility function u(.),
the objective of the DM is to calculate the optimal portfolio X, based on her subjective beliefs,
that maximises the expected utility, subject to the budget and the non-negativity constraints.
The optimal allocation is given by solving:
max
X
pi(R)u(eRxR) + pi(B)u(eBxB) + pi(Y)u(eYxY)
s.t. xR + xB + xY = m










Assuming a particular form of the utility function, we obtain closed-form solutions regarding
the demand of each asset of the form x∗s = f (pi, m, e, l), where pi is the set of subjective beliefs,
m is the experimental income, e is the vector of exchange rates, l is a vector of individual
characteristics (e.g. risk aversion) and s ∈ {R, B, Y}. By definition, a DM that holds additive
subjective beliefs is characterised by a neutral attitude towards ambiguity.
4.2 The α-Maxmin Model
In this section we relax the assumption of additive beliefs and we introduce non-neutral am-
biguity attitudes assuming that the DM has α-Maxmin preferences (α-MEU, Ghirardato et al.
(2004)). In this model the agent believes that the true probabilities over the state space lie
within a continuous, closed and convex set of subjective priors Π (multiple-priors representa-
tion). This set includes all the possible scenarios regarding the future states of the world, in
the form of subjective probability distributions (beliefs). Figure 1 illustrates this set Π using a
two-dimensional unit simplex (known as the Marschak-Machina Triangle (MMT)23) where the
probability that the state of the world is R (Y) is represented in the horizontal (vertical) axis. As-
suming that there exist non-zero low bounds of the DM’s subjective beliefs (pi(R),pi(B),pi(Y)),
we are able to draw the interior triangle, the size of which illustrates the degree of ambiguity
23This representation of prior beliefs in the MEU model first appeared in Hey et al. (2010) and then broadly used
in the ambiguity literature (see Kothiyal et al. (2014), Burghart et al. (2015)).
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perception of the agent. When this interior triangle coincides with the simplex, the DM per-
ceives ambiguity at its maximum level whereas, when it shrinks to a single point inside the
simplex, then all ambiguity vanishes, the set Π is a singleton and the model reduces to SEU.
In the general case, a portfolio X = (xR, xG, xB) is evaluated as a convex combination of its
















with Π = {pi(s) : pi(s) ≥ pi(s)} and s ∈ {B, R, Y}24. The α coefficient can be interpreted as a
measure of the agent’s aversion to this perceived ambiguity. When α = 1 the model collapses to
the MEU preferences (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) where maximal aversion to ambiguity is
expressed. In contrast, when α = 0, all the weight is put to the optimistic outcome. Intuitively,
α > 0.5 implies that the DM is ambiguity averse, whereas α < 0.5 implies ambiguity seeking
attitude. Notice that in the particular framework of our study, α = 0.5 does not imply ambigu-
ity neutral attitudes and the model does not collapse to SEU as is the case in Ahn et al. (2014).
Neutral attitudes are expressed by the uniqueness of the set Π. When this set is a singleton,
the model is equivalent to the SEU and the parameter α cannot be identified.
Before presenting the different types of the DMs we present how this model can be ex-
tended to its dynamic form. As is common in the ambiguity literature, this model satisfies the
property of separating subjective beliefs from tastes (ambiguity attitudes). Therefore, when
updating takes place, only the belief part of the preferences’ representation is affected, while
utility remains intact.
4.3 Updating Beliefs in Multiple-priors Models
We first present the updating rules for MEU, the special case of α-MEU when α = 1. Then
these rules can be naturally extended for the Hurwicz α criteria family. In the literature there
have been suggested two ways to update beliefs in multiple-priors models, one that satisfies
DC (Epstein and Schneider (2003), Hanany and Klibanoff (2009), Hanany et al. (2011)) and
one that satisfies C (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993), Pires (2002), Eichberger et al. (2007)). In
the former case, it suffices to solve the problem as a static one and the allocation in the first
period will determine the conditional allocation of the second period, respecting always the
MEU preferences of the DM. The interesting case is when C is assumed which allows the
agent to behave in a dynamically inconsistent manner. The two most commonly updating
24We summarise the various sets of priors in Table 1.
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rules include the Maximum Likelihood Update (MLU) and the Full Bayesian Update (FBU)25
rule. According to the MLU rule, only the set of priors that maximise the probability of the
conditional event are updated according to the Bayes rule. In the FBU rule , all the sets of
priors are updated in a Bayesian way and the set of posteriors is used to evaluate the different
acts. In the supplementary material, we show that in our framework with three ambiguous
assets, MLU and FBU coincide. Therefore, in our analysis we assume that beliefs are updated
according to the MLE rule. We now define the three behavioural types we consider and we
describe how the update rules are extended to accommodate α-MEU type of preferences (when
updating takes place).
4.4 Taxonomy of the Types
We classify DMs based on two criteria: (1) which axiom do they satisfy and (2) if they are
time inconsistent, whether they are aware of this inconsistency or not. We follow Machina
(1989) who defines four different types of DMs in dynamic choice under risk: the so called
α-people, the dynamically consistent agents that maximise EU preferences, the β-people that are
non-EU agents and apply consequentialism, acting in a dynamically inconsistent way (myopic
behaviour), the γ-people who are non-EU agents but are dynamically consistent and finally,
the δ-people who are characterised as sophisticated and satisfy consistent planning26. We adopt
the terminology of Hey and Panaccione (2011) and we define the naı¨ve, the resolute and the
sophisticated type that correspond to the β-people, γ-people and δ-people respectively27.
4.4.1 The Resolute Type
The resolute type, first introduced in Hammond (1988), and later formalised in McClennen
(1990) and Machina (1989) in risky contexts, embraces the simplest strategy. A resolute DM,
satisfies DC and the allocations at both stages coincide. This may happen for two reasons,
as either the DM is dedicated to somehow commit to the first stage allocations regardless the
available information at t = 128, or one can assume that beliefs are updated in a dynamically
consistent manner as in Epstein and Schneider (2003). In either case, the resolute strategy with
commitment is behaviourally equivalent to the dynamically consistent updating of beliefs, and
25See Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) for an axiomatisation of the rules and for references. They refer to these rules
as pseudo-Bayesian rules.
26A similar classification has been also applied first in hyperbolic discounting contexts (O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999)) and later in Hey and Panaccione (2011) and Barberis (2012), in contexts of dynamic decision making under
risk. Houser et al. (2004) study heterogeneity in planning strategies in a dynamic stochastic decision problem under
certainty.
27Barberis (2012) considers two types of sophistication, one without commitment and one with. These types
correspond to our sophisticated and resolute respectively.
28This strategy is also known as aversion to information.
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to find the optimal solution, it suffices to solve the first stage problem. The optimal allocation
is calculated by optimising Equation 2 subject to the budget constraint, given the DM’s indi-
vidual characteristics and subjective beliefs. We denote with zs the return of asset s which is
defined as the product between the exchange rate of the asset (es) and the amount of income
that has been allocated to this asset (xs): zs = es × xs with s ∈ {R, B, Y}. Then, in order to
calculate the optimal allocation, one needs to take into consideration the relative ranking be-
tween the returns of the three assets. Take for example the ranking zR ≥ zB ≥ zY29 where red
is the best possible outcome and yellow the worst. The maximum expected utility occurs at the
point where the probability of the best outcome to happen is maximised (point A in Figure
1). Similarly, the minimum expected utility is obtained at the point where the probability of
the best outcome R is minimised or stating it differently, where the probability of the worst
outcome Y is maximised (point C). Then the α-Maxmin utility from a portfolio X is:
U(X) =α[(1− pi(B)− pi(Y))u(eRxR) + pi(B)u(eBxB) + pi(Y)u(eYxY)]
+ (1− α)[pi(R)u(eRxR) + pi(B)u(eBxB) + (1− pi(R)− pi(B))u(eYxY)]
and writing the utility from the portfolio in its general form, the objective of the DM is to
find an allocation X that optimises U(X) = ∑s∈S pi(s)u(esxs), subject to the budget and the
non-negativity constraints. Here pi(s) is defined as pi(s) = αpimin(s) + (1− α)pimax(s) where
pimin (pimax) stands for the set of priors where the probability of the best outcome to happen is
minimised (maximised). The solution of this program will provide the optimal demand for the
three assets in the form x∗s = f (pi, m, e, l), where pi are now the non-additive subjective beliefs
and l includes both the risk and the ambiguity attitude, which will coincide with the optimal
conditional demand.
4.4.2 The Naı¨ve Type
The naı¨ve or myopic behaviour was first introduced in the literature in Strotz (1955-56) and
later in Pollak (1968) indicating an agent who fails to understand the sequential nature of the
problem. As a consequence, each of the stages is faced independently of the other, strategy that
may lead to dynamic inconsistencies and dominated results. The allocation at each stage is
based on the optimisation of the objective function at the current stage, or stating in a different
way, the DM solves a series of static problems and maximises utility at present. A naı¨ve DM
ignores that she is time inconsistent and as a result, the decisions that are made can potentially
differ from those that had been planned. At the first stage, this type behaves in the same way
29In the supplementary material, we enumerate all the possible 13 rankings including both weak and strict in-
equalities. We also describe how our algorithm calculates the optimal allocation.
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as a resolute does and solves the problem as if it is a static one, leading to the unconditional




Y). Then, at stage 2, she receives the partial information that one of
the states did not occur, updates her prior beliefs, and based on these posteriors, she solves
the maximisation problem that now involves the two remaining states subject to the available
income. Consider again the ranking zR ≥ zB ≥ zY. The DM chooses a portfolio allocation
for the first period. Now assume that the partial information that the ball is not yellow (¬Y)
is revealed. Using the MLU rule, the DM updates those priors that maximise the probability
of the event pi(¬Y) (or pi(R ∪ B)). In Figure 1, this occurs in both the prior sets A and B. In
addition, since the ranking of the outcomes requires that zR ≥ zB30, for the evaluation of the
α-Maxmin utility it holds that pimax = piA and pimin = piB. We denote with xR¬Y, xB¬Y the
allocations to assets R and B respectively, conditional on the information that the state is not
Y. The utility of the DM of this conditional portfolio is:
U(X) = pi(R|¬Y)u(eRxR¬Y) + pi(B|¬Y)u(eBxB¬Y) (3)
with pi(R|¬Y) = αpiB(R|¬Y) + (1− α)piA(R|¬Y) (pi(B|¬Y) is defined in a similar way31). The
problem now requires to find the conditional allocation that optimises this α-MEU, subject to
both the non-negativity constraint and the new budget constraint mˆ¬Y = m − x∗Y where m
is the initial endowed income and x∗Y is unconditional allocation to asset Y. The conditional
demand will be of the form x∗s
¬q = f (pˆi, mˆ¬Y, e, l) for s ∈ S\q and s 6= q, where pˆi is now the
set of the updated beliefs.
4.4.3 The Sophisticated Type
Strotz (1955-56) and later Pollak (1968) were among the first to recognise that pre-commitment
(resolute type) is not always the optimal strategy. More specifically, the idea is that a DM who
is not able to commit to her future behaviour, would prefer to adopt a strategy of consistent
planning and then pick up the optimal plan that will be actually followed, sketching the profile
of a sophisticated type. A sophisticated DM applies backward induction in order to figure out the
optimal strategy for every given problem. As Hammond and Zank (2014) describe, sophisti-
cation is like the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of an extensive form game, between the
future and present self of the DM, as in Selten (1975). Starting from the final decision nodes of
a decision tree (the last period) a DM anticipates an event E to occur and therefore, the future
course of action is determined by the conditional preferences of the ex-post self. Working back-
30Notice that for the naı¨ve DM, it is not necessary for the ranking between the returns of two assets to be the
same in both stages. Our estimation algorithm takes this possibility into consideration.
31The interested reader can consult the supplementary material where we extensively present how all the up-
dated beliefs are calculated.
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wards and applying the same principle to all the previous decision nodes, always satisfying
the preferences of the ex-post self, she can define the optimal path that will lead her from the
start of the tree to the most preferable node. In this way, an optimal plan of action for the whole
problem is chosen. Following this process, the DM will violate DC, as the second period opti-
mal allocation is based on the conditional beliefs which have been updated in a dynamically
inconsistent way32. Nevertheless, the agent is aware of this inconsistency and as is described
in Pollak (1968), “succeeds to adopt a strategy of consistent planning and choose the best plan
among those that he will actually follow.” The above idea has been axiomatised and applied
in dynamic choice under ambiguity in Siniscalchi (2011).
The optimal solution for the sophisticated type requires two steps. Let again the same or-
dering of the outcomes zR ≥ zB ≥ zY. As the solution requires the DM to work backwards,
she first solves all the three conditional problems (¬R,¬B,¬Y), using her conditional beliefs
and satisfying the budget and non-negativity constraints. For instance, when the information
is ¬Y, the optimisation problem is to find the conditional allocation for assets R and B, taking
into consideration the conditional beliefs, that they have now been updated based on the rel-
evant information, and always satisfying the outcome ranking (zR ≥ zB) and the conditional
budget constraint mˆ¬Y = m − x∗Y. The conditional allocations x∗R¬Y and x∗B¬Y can be written
in the general form x∗s
¬q = f (pˆi, e, mˆ, l) for s ∈ S\q and s 6= q (similarly we solve for the con-
ditional allocations for ¬B and ¬Y). These demands are calculated in the same way as the
second-stage decisions of the naı¨ve DM (see section 4.4.2) and they indicate to the agent what
would be the optimal course of action for each of the conditional states (last stage of the deci-
sion problem). The second step of the solution, requires to solve the first stage unconditional
problem taking into consideration the optimal conditional allocations, the non-negativity and
budget constraint, as well as the relevant ranking constraint between the outcomes. The α-























with pi(R|¬Y) = αpiB(R|¬Y) + (1− α)piA(R|¬Y) and pi(¬Y) = αpiB(¬Y) + (1− α)piA(¬Y)
where piA = pimax and piB = pimin are the sets of priors that satisfy the ranking of the out-
comes (similarly we define the probabilities for the cases ¬R and ¬B). The probability of each
conditional event is multiplied by 1/2 since the subjects were informed in advance that the par-
32Otherwise the sophisticated strategy is identical to the resolute one.
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tial information to be revealed, is randomly chosen from the two available states with equal
chances33. This also ensures that pi(S) = 1. Notice that the conditional demands are a func-
tion of the conditional income mˆ¬s = m− x∗s which in turn is a function of the unconditional
optimal demand for the asset s at stage 1. To calculate the unconditional demand for the three
assets, it suffices to substitute the conditional income to Equation 4 and optimise with respect
to the unconditional demands x∗s . Given these demands and plugging-in to the formulas of
conditional income, we derive the conditional demands.
Suffice to say that if the agent is probabilistically sophisticated (holds additive beliefs) then
the three types are behaviourally indistinguishable compared to SEU.
5 Experimental Procedures
Upon arrival to the lab, subjects were randomly assigned to a computer terminal and were
provided with written instructions34. After reading the instructions, the participants were able
to go through a slide-show presentation which was available at each computer terminal and
contained simplified instructions and examples, which could navigate at their own pace. Then,
they were free to go near the Bingo Blower, which was located in the middle of the lab, and
observe its composition regarding the three assets. During the experiment a live image of the
Bingo Blower was projected through two large screens in the lab and in addition, the subjects
were free to walk around and physically observe it at all times. The actual composition of the
Bingo Blower consisted of 4 blue (20%), 6 red (30%) and 10 yellow (50%) balls out of the total
2035. The participants were then presented with the 60 2-stage allocation questions36. As men-
tioned before, an allocation problem consisted of a specific amount of experimental income
and the exchange rates of the three assets. The income ranged from 9 to 110 units, expressed
in tokens, and the exchange rates between experimental income and money, ranged from 0.1
to 1.8. All subjects faced the same set of allocation questions, presented in a randomised order
to each participant in an effort to eliminate any potential order effects.
The experimental interface was developed in Python.37 Each allocation question that the
33This was defined by the experimental software by an independent, random draw from a uniform distribution
for each of the allocation problems.
34The instructions are available in the supplementary material.
35From two pilot studies we ran, it seems that changing the colour with the highest likelihood, does not affect
the results.
36The questions have been chosen after extensive Monte Carlo simulations that would ensure three issues: (1)
that for a simulated dataset using a given set of parameter values, it is possible to estimate (recover) the value of the
actual parameters; (2) that it is possible to identify between the different specifications and; (3) that our estimation
programs work efficiently. See Section 6 for details on the econometric analysis.
37Python Software Foundation. Python Language Reference, version 2.7. Available at http://www.python.org.
Screenshots of the experimental framework can be found in the supplementary material.
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subjects were required to answer had two stages. In the first stage screen, the subjects could see
three sliders, one for each respective asset, and information on the allocation question (the total
income to allocate and the exchange rates of the three assets). The sliders were programmed
to be inter-connected with each other, so at any time, the budget constraint would be satisfied
with strict equality (there was no possibility to allocate money to a safe asset or to allocate
negative amounts). In addition, information was provided regarding the allocated income
to each asset and the respective second-stage potential income that this allocation implied,
depending on the conditional state of the world. Subjects were required to spend at least 10
seconds before submitting their preferred allocation and they had 90 seconds available for
each stage38. Pushing the “next” button at stage 1, the software was programmed to reveal
some hypothetical partial information based on a uniform distribution. In the second stage,
the subjects could only see two sliders for the remaining states of the word, along with all the
relevant information (available conditional income, exchange rates and expected payoffs). The
choices were recorded in integer steps in the range [0,m].
The experiment was conducted at an experimental economic lab in the UK, known to pro-
hibit deception between May and June 2013. 58 subjects were recruited from a standard stu-
dent experimental population using the ORSEE system (Greiner (2004)). The majority of the
subjects were undergraduate students from several different majors and 52% were females.
The experiment lasted for less than one hour and the subjects were paid privately and in cash
directly after the end of the experiment. The average payment was £14.16 including a show-up
fee of £3. The maximum payment was £25.5. The payment was determined by applying the
random incentive mechanism, where one out of the 60 problems was randomly chosen (different
for each participant) to be played for real. The computer then recovered the actual choices of
the participant at that problem, as well as the partial information that was revealed (i.e. the
state is not s). Then, the subject was continuously drawing balls, till a ball that is not s came
out. That ball determined the actual state of the world and the participant was paid the amount
that was allocated at this state, at the specific problem.
6 Econometric Analysis
We estimate the specifications presented in section 4, based on a subject-level analysis. Adopt-
ing this approach, allows to introduce between and within subjects heterogeneity in three dif-
ferent dimensions. First, instead of assuming a representative agent, we individually estimate
38Subjects were informed that if they have not submitted their allocation before the 90 seconds, the computer
would allocate zero amounts to the three assets. This happened only three times out of the total 6960 observations.
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the values of the preference parameters (risk and ambiguity attitudes, beliefs, precision) for
each of our subjects without requiring any uniform pattern of behaviour. In addition to the
parameter heterogeneity, we account for heterogeneity regarding the planning strategies of
the agents by fitting the individual data to both the SEU model and the three different type
specifications. Finally, we allow for heterogeneity within the participants by incorporating a
random (stochastic) part in choices so as to capture within-person variability (noise).
We need to make few structural assumptions regarding the shape of the utility function, the
ambiguity model and the stochastic structure of our data in order to be able to jointly estimate
all the parameters of interest. We assume that the subjects receive utility from a power utility





1−r if r 6= 1
ln(x) if r = 1
where x is the respective payoff and r is the coefficient of risk aversion. The reasons why we
favour the power form of utility are twofold. On the one hand, there is extensive evidence
that the CRRA utility function provides a good fit to experimental data (Wakker (2008), Stott
(2006), Balcombe and Fraser (2015)). Then, assuming a power utility naturally satisfies the
non-negativity constraint that was imposed by our experimental protocol, as the CRRA rep-
resentation does not allow for boundary portfolios (allocating everything or nothing to one
asset)39. Regarding the ambiguity model, we adopt the α-MEU specification mainly for five
reasons: (1) it provides a parsimonious way to capture perceived ambiguity; (2) in contrast to the
MEU model which is characterised by pessimism, the α-MEU takes into consideration both
the worst and the best case scenario, providing a measure of attitude towards ambiguity; (3)
there have been well-established updating rules for the multiple-priors family of models, for
both the dynamically consistent and inconsistent DM; (4) combining α-MEU with power utility
provides elegant, closed-form solutions for the optimal allocations and; (5) kinked specifications
have been shown to fit experimental data better compared to smooth ones (Ahn et al. (2014)).
Finally, we need to adopt an appropriate model to capture the stochastic part of decisions.
In the literature there have been proposed various ways to model noise and variability in
choices (see Wilcox (2008), Bardsley et al. (2009, chap. 7)). Since our data are continuous and
constrained by definition to the interval [0, m], a convenient way to model noise in choices
is to follow Hey and Panaccione (2011) and consider the ratio xs/m at a specific allocation
question. This amount is constrained to the unit interval and therefore, we can assume that
39Only a risk neutral or risk loving agent would choose a boundary portfolio in this particular framework.
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the ratio xsm is distributed according to a Beta distribution, a continuous probability distribution
defined in the interval [0, 1]. A Beta distributed variable, is characterised by two positive shape
parameters α and β and the moments (mean and variance) of this distribution are given by
Ex = αα+β and Var(x) =
αβ
(α+β)2(α+β+1) respectively. By setting α =
x∗s
m (σ − 1) and β = (1−
x∗s









σ , where xs is the actual allocation
observed in the experiment, x∗s is the optimal constrained allocation for asset s, for a given
allocation problem and σ is an indicator of the precision of the distribution of the random
variable xsm .
40 The former expression implies that the random variable xsm is centered to
x∗s
m ,
while the latter, implies that the variance becomes smaller at the bounds 0 and 1 and larger
near 0.5. We then need to specify the likelihood function that will be maximised. As there
are two stages, with 3-way allocations in the first stage and 2-way in the second, it suffices
to consider two of the allocations in the first stage and one at the second. For instance, let
for a given allocation problem the unconditional allocation xR, xB, xY to red, blue and yellow
and assume the conditional state ¬Y that will lead to the conditional allocation xR¬Y, xB¬Y
and the conditional income mˆ¬Y. Using the allocations at the first stage, we assume that xRm is
Beta distributed, with the appropriate shape parameters that satisfy the properties above. As
the actual allocations are recorded in integer values during the experiment, we approximate
the contribution to the likelihood function from a continuous Beta distribution. Thus, for the
above example and for a given allocation problem i, the contribution to the likelihood function
by the allocation to the red asset is given by:
g1 =

if xR = 0, Prob( xRm = 0)= ln(Φ(
0.5
m , α, β));
if xR = m, Prob( xRm = 1)= ln(1−Φ(m−0.5m , α, β));




m , α, β)−Φ( x
∗
R−0.5
m , α, β));
Then, we consider the remaining available income and we assume that xBm−xR is also Beta dis-
tributed. Again the contribution to the likelihood function by the blue asset is given by:
g2 =

if xB = 0, Prob( xBm−xR = 0)= ln(Φ(
0.5
m−x∗R , α, β));
if xB = m− xR, Prob( xBm−xR = 1)= ln(1−Φ(
m−x∗R−0.5
m−x∗R , α, β));




m−x∗R , α, β)−Φ(
x∗B−0.5
m−x∗R , α, β));
Finally, at the conditional stage, we assume the same for the conditional allocation to red with





if xR¬Y = 0, Prob( xR
¬Y
m−xY = 0)= ln(Φ(
0.5
m−x∗Y , α, β));
if xR¬Y = m− xY, Prob( xR¬Ym−xY = 1)= ln(1−Φ(
m−x∗Y−0.5
m−x∗Y , α, β));






m−x∗Y , α, β)−Φ(
x∗R
¬Y−0.5
m−x∗Y , α, β));
40The higher the value of σ, the more precise are the choices.
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where xs is the actual observed choice, x∗s is the optimal allocation for a given allocation ques-
tion i and Φ stands for the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the Beta distribution. We
consider the remaining two conditional states in a symmetric way. The likelihood function to
maximise is defined as:







gi(r, α,pi, σ, X)) (5)
We then jointly estimate the values of the parameters by maximising Equation 5 using Max-
imum Likelihood Estimation techniques. As the problem is quite complex in nature, it is ex-
pected that the likelihood surface will not be smooth and consequently, a global maximum
will not be easy to reach. To ensure that the solution is not trapped to a local optimum, and
that we instead reach a global one, we use a general nonlinear augmented Lagrange multiplier
optimisation routine that allows for random initialisation of the starting parameters as well as
multiple restarts of the solver.41 We conclude this section by commenting on the number of
parameters for all the specifications, as well as on the lower and upper bounds that we apply
in our estimation codes. For the SEU specification there are four parameters to estimate, the
coefficient of risk attitude r, the subjective beliefs for two out of the three states piR and piB and
the precision parameter σ. For the α-MEU specifications, we need to estimate on top of r and
σ, the set of non-additive priors pi (the lower bounds) for the three states and the coefficient
of ambiguity attitude α, giving in total 6 parameters. As was mentioned before, we assume
either risk aversion or risk neutrality therefore, r ≥ 0. The set of non-additive beliefs should
satisfy the constraint pi(R) + pi(B) + pi(Y) ≤ 1 and α is constrained to the interval [0,1], with 0
expressing extreme ambiguity seeking and 1 extreme ambiguity aversion.
7 Results
Before presenting the results, it is important to stress the fact that all the analysis, directly
depends on the structural assumptions concerning the functional forms and the stochastics, as
those presented in section 6. In addition, an assumption that is implicitly made is that the type
of the subjects remains stable during the experimental session and the same holds for their
preferences.
To obtain a general idea of our results, we first plotted the portfolios of the subjects for each
of the conditional states. Figure 2 illustrates the choices for three42 subjects for all the questions
41The estimation was conducted using the R programming language for statistical computing (The R Manu-
als, version 3.0.2. Available at: http://www.r-project.org/). For the multiple-restarts routine, the package rsolnp
(Ghalanos and Theussl (2012)) was used. The estimation codes are available upon request.
42The full set of scatter plots, for all the conditional states and all the subjects is available upon request.
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where the information ¬B was revealed. The horizontal (vertical) axis represents the payoff
if the ball is yellow (red). The 45° line stands for all the portfolio allocations that guarantee
the same payoff, regardless the actual state of the world43. The hollow (solid) dots correspond
to portfolios at period 0 (1). Two points in this Figure worth noticing. First, it is apparent
that there is extensive violation of DC, since for a dynamically consistent agent, the portfolio
allocations for the two periods should coincide. On top of that, these violations do not seem
to follow a uniform pattern, indicating the existence of a variety of planning types.44 Along all
the datasets, we find extensive heterogeneity, with subjects’ choices sharing similarities with
one of the three types shown in Figure 2, fact that calls for further structural investigation.
For each of the 58 participants, we fitted all the possible types that we described in section
4.45 For each subject and for each type, we have estimates of their subjective beliefs, the co-
efficient of risk and ambiguity attitudes (r and α), the precision parameter σ and the value of
the maximised log-likelihood. Based on the value of the maximised log-likelihood, we can detect
which type best explains data (provides the best fit to the data) for each subject and there-
fore, classify subjects to different types. The first column in Table 2 reports the mean and the
standard deviation of the fitted log-likelihoods across all subjects. On average, the likelihood
is highest for the sophisticated type. Nevertheless, since SEU has 2 degrees of freedom less
compared to α-MEU, every α-MEU specification is bound to perform at least as well as SEU
due to overfitting. Thus, this comparison is meaningful only when we compare across the three
types. To take this difference into consideration, we correct for the degrees of freedom by cal-
culating both the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), that controls for the different number
of parameters and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), that accounts for both the number
of the parameters and the size of the dataset46. The values of AIC and BIC are reported in
columns 2 and 3 respectively, in Table 2. On average, it seems that the sophisticated type is the
best, followed by the naı¨ve, the resolute and then the SEU.
In Table 3 we use the values of the maximised log-likelihood, the AIC and the BIC, to
classify types at the individual level. The first column of the Table reports the classification
based on the fitted log-likelihood. As expected, SEU has always the worst performance. For
the rest of the types, the sophisticated is the best for 50% of our subjects, followed by the
naı¨ve and the resolute with roughly the same proportions. Columns 2 and 3 report the same
43An extremely risk averse agent would always choose portfolios along this line.
44Indeed, subsequent econometric analysis confirmed that the left panel in Figure 2 belongs to a resolute subject
(subject 13), the middle to a naı¨ve (subject 17) and the right to a sophisticated one (subject 27).
45The subject-level analysis created a large dataset that contains the estimated parameters for each individual
and for all the specifications. We do not report it here, but full details are available upon request.
46BIC = −2 ln(L(θˆ|x)) + k ln(n), AIC = −2 ln(L(θˆ|x)) + 2k where ln(L(θˆ|x)) is the value of the maximised
log-likelihood, k is the number of the free parameters in the model and n the number of observations. As is the case
with the value of the log-likelihood, a lower value indicates a better fitting.
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information based on the corrected log-likelihoods. When AIC is used to interpret the data,
the prominent type is the sophisticated one (34%), followed by the SEU (28%), the naı¨ve (21%)
and the resolute (17%). However, when BIC is used, the majority of the subjects are classified
as SEU (53%), followed by the sophisticated type (24%) and a minority of naı¨ve (12%) and
resolute (10%) DMs. Depending on the two information criteria, it seems impossible to make
a safe inference regarding the classification of the types. Hence, we proceed by testing the
statistical significance of the difference between the values of the fitted log-likelihoods of the
different types. In other words, we test whether the maximised log-likelihood for the best-
fitting type, is significantly higher compared to SEU. To this end, we conduct likelihood ratio
tests. These tests have been used to compare two nested models where the null model is a
special case of the alternative model47. The test statistic is given by the ratio of the two fitted
likelihood functions





where Ls is the maximised likelihood of the simpler model (the nested model) while Ls is the
maximised likelihood of the general model (the nesting model). The LRT statistic follows a
Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom d fg − d fs, with d fg and d fs being the number
of free parameters for the nesting and the nested model respectively. With 4 parameters of
the SEU and 6 of the α-MEU, the test statistic is distributed with 2 degrees of freedom. Table
4 reports the classification of the subjects to types, based on the significance of the LRT. SEU
best describes behaviour for 53.4% (46.5%) of our experimental population at 1% (5%) level of
significance. For the remaining non-SEU population, the majority can be classified as sophisti-
cated 51.9% (52.6%), followed by the naı¨ve DMs 25.9% (25.8%) and the resolute 22.2% (22.6%).
This finding contradicts Hey and Panaccione (2011) who find that a significant proportion of
DMs are resolute. Nevertheless, they study dynamic choice in risky environments, using a
different decision task, so it is not possible to directly compare the results.
Finding 1. For the majority of the subjects, we cannot reject the null hypothesis at 1% significance
level, that they are behaving according to the SEU model and therefore comply with Bayesian updating.
Focusing on the non-SEU subjects, the sophisticated type best explains behaviour for more than half of
the population, followed by the naı¨ve and the resolute type.
The above classification provides evidence to the question of which axiom do the subjects
satisfy when they tackle dynamic decisions under ambiguity. When we consider the non-SEU
47Two models are nested, if the first model can be transformed into the second model by imposing constraints
on the parameters of the first model. In our framework, when the beliefs are additive, the α-meu is transformed to
the SEU, so the SEU model is nested within the α-MEU.
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subjects, 77.4% of the subjects satisfy C, while only 22.6% satisfy DC48, which confirms the
results in Dominiak et al. (2012). In the total population, 53.4% (46.5%) satisfy both DC and C,
10.3% (12.1%) satisfy only DC and 36.2% (41.4%) satisfy C.
Finding 2. Less than 1/4 of the experimental population with non-neutral ambiguity attitudes satisfies
DC, while the vast majority satisfies C. In the total experimental population, more than half of the
participants satisfy both axioms.
We now turn to the estimates of our structural models. Table 5 reports a summary of the
mean and the standard deviation of the estimated values of the parameters, for all the specifi-
cations and types. We also report the median, especially for the risk aversion and the precision
parameter, as the existence of extremely risk averse subjects or subjects with high levels of
precision, inflates the value of the average49. On aggregate, there is extensive heterogeneity
regarding the values of the parameters. We illustrate this by providing the density plots for
the parameters under investigation. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the risk aversion coeffi-
cient which confirms the lack of a uniform level of risk aversion, a commonly observed pattern
in experiments of choice under risk. Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the distribution of the estimated
subjective probabilities for the blue, red and the yellow states respectively, for all the types
(the vertical dashed line indicates the objective probability of each state). Two aspects in these
distributions worth noticing. First, it seems that the distribution of the estimated beliefs when
SEU is assumed, is characterised by less fat tails compared to the non-SEU types. Then, when
the value of subjective beliefs is compared to the objective probabilities that were actually ap-
plied during the experiment, it seems that subjects over-estimate low probability events and
under-estimate high probability events. Evidence for this finding is provided by both Table 5
and Figures 4-6. In all four cases, both the median and the average of the low probability event
(B) is significantly higher compared to the actual one (the distribution in Figure 4 is skewed
to the right). Similarly, the estimates for the high probability event (Y) are significantly lower
compared to the objective probability (the distribution in Figure 6 is skewed to the left). This
result is in line with similar findings with a commonly observed over (under)-weighting of
low (high) probability events, confirming the existence of likelihood insensitivity50. Various ex-
periments have demonstrated the existence of this insensitivity in both student and general
48The results are identical at both 1 and 5% level of significance.
49In theory, the value of risk aversion for an extremely risk averse subject tends to infinity. In our estimation
program, we set the upper bound for risk aversion equal to 10 and for the precision parameter 100. The logic
behind this choice is that when risk aversion is significantly high, it is impossible to behaviourally distinguish
choices (allocations tend to equalise payoffs at every state). For the precision parameter, we set it sufficiently high,
so that it can accommodate behaviour for most of the subjects.
50As is explained in Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015), likelihood insensitivity appears when people cannot
distinguish between events bounded away from zero and one and transform subjective likelihoods towards fifty-
fifty, resulting to an over-weighting of unlikely events and under-weighting of highly likelihood events.
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populations, all in static frameworks (see among others Wakker (2010) and Abdellaoui et al.
(2011)). The present study, verifies the existence of this component of ambiguity attitudes, in
dynamic choice frameworks. Finally, Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of the sum of sub-
jective beliefs for each of the three types51 since the family of multiple-prior models is based
on the assumption of non-additive beliefs. The Figure confirms the existence of non-additivity
showing that for the majority of the subjects, the sum of beliefs is distributed in the interval
[0.80-1). This finding is in line with the results in Baillon and Bleichrodt (2015) who report
extensive violation of probabilistic sophistication.
Finding 3. There is a systematic over-weighting of the low probability event and similarly, an under-
weighting of the high probability event.
Based on the above estimations, we can classify subjects according to their attitudes to-
wards ambiguity. Notice that all SEU subjects are automatically classified as ambiguity neu-
tral. For the non-SEU subjects, the classification is based on the value of the α parameter, where
for α > 0.5 the subject exhibits ambiguity averse attitude, while for α < 0.5 ambiguity seek-
ing. For the classification of the non-SEU subjects, we consider the estimated value of α for the
best fitting type. 53.4% (46.6%) of the subjects are characterised as ambiguity neutral, 24.1%
(27.6%) ambiguity seeking and 22.4% (25.9%) ambiguity averse at 1% (5%) level of significance
respectively. These results are in line with Charness et al. (2013), Hey and Pace (2014), Ahn
et al. (2014) and Stahl (2014), all accounting for ambiguity attitudes in static frameworks.
Finding 4. For more than half of the population we cannot reject the null hypothesis of neutral ambi-
guity attitudes and therefore, SEU preferences. For the non-SEU agents, ambiguity seeking and averse
attitudes are observed in roughly equal proportions.
At this point we have classified the subjects based on the significance of the LRT. In order
to provide an indication of how much better the best-fitting type is, relative to the others, we
adopt a Bayesian approach and we calculate the posterior probabilities of the resolute, naı¨ve
and sophisticated types being the actual ones, assuming that the ex-ante probability was equal
to 1/3 for each type. Denoting by ll(r), ll(n) and ll(s) the fitted log-likelihood values for the
resolute, naı¨ve and sophisticated type respectively, the posterior probability that type i is the
correct one, is given by
P(i) =
exp(ll(i))
exp(ll(r)) + exp(ll(n)) + exp(ll(s))
(6)
with i ∈ {r,n,s}. To illustrate this with an example, for subject 8 we obtained the follow-
ing values for the log-likelihoods: ll(r) = −424.84, ll(n) = −426.39 and ll(s) = −423.59.
51By definition, in the SEU model the beliefs add up to 1.
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Substituting these values to Equation 6, the posterior probabilities for the three types are
P(r) = 0.21, P(n) = 0.04 and P(s) = 0.74 indicating that the probability of the subject being
sophisticated is almost three times higher than being resolute, while it is quite unlikely that
this subject is naı¨ve. Figure 8 presents these posteriors graphically. Since we consider three
types, it is possible to represent the probabilities with a triangle. The horizontal (vertical) axis
represents the probability of the sophisticated (resolute) being the correct type while the prob-
ability of the naı¨ve is simply the residual. The triangle is divided in three equally-sized areas,
with the top one being where the resolute type is most probable, the bottom-left being where
the naı¨ve is the most probable and the bottom-right indicating the area where the sophisticated
is the most probable. Figure 8a illustrates the posteriors for all the participants, while Figure
8b only for the subjects with non-neutral attitudes. Notice that in the first case (all subjects),
there is both concentration towards the vertices of the triangle, where the probability of being
type i is maximised, and concentration around the middle point which corresponds to being
one of the types with equal probability. When we focus only on the ambiguity non-neutral
subjects, the posteriors clearly tend towards the vertices, confirming the robustness of our re-
sults. We conclude by noting that there is a significant concentration of posterior probabilities
in the neighborhood of 1 for the naı¨ve and the sophisticated type, indicating that these types
perform significantly better compared to the resolute type.
Finally, since we have estimated parameters at the individual level, we investigate whether
there is any kind of correlation between risk and ambiguity attitudes. A similar test is mean-
ingful only for the subset of subjects with non-neutral attitude towards ambiguity. For this
set, we use the estimated parameters of risk and ambiguity attitude of the best fitted type for
each individual. Using a Pearson product-moment correlation test, we find that there is virtu-
ally no correlation between the two measures (ρ=-0.065, p-value = 0.727). This result confirms
the findings in Cohen et al. (2011) who find no correlation between the risk and ambiguity
attitudes. Moreover, this finding raises interesting methodological issues that call for further
investigation. In the experimental literature of ambiguity preferences, there is still no consen-
sus of whether there is correlation or not between the two measures of attitude. Trautmann
and van de Kuilen (2015) provide a review of the various studies that test for the existence
of correlation and conclude that the majority of the studies that report positive correlation,
are based on elicitation methods that measure risk and ambiguity attitudes separately. Recent
experimental evidence suggests that risk elicitation procedures are likely to be highly context-
specific (Loomes and Pogrebna, 2014) and therefore, joint elicitation of risk and ambiguity
attitudes may be more informative regarding the actual relation between the two.
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Finding 5. There is no significant correlation between risk and ambiguity attitudes.
8 Conclusion
In this study we report the results of a simple two-period portfolio allocation experiment,
where we study heterogeneity in dynamic decision making under ambiguity. Based on which
rationality axiom people satisfy in combination with assumptions of their planning strategy,
we categorise subjects to resolute, naı¨ve and sophisticated. Our results are summarised as: (1)
almost half of the subjects behave according to the SEU model and comply with Bayesian up-
dating; (2) there is extensive violation of dynamic consistency by the non-SEU subjects; (3) the
majority of the non-SEU subjects are sophisticated, few are naı¨ve and a few are resolute; (4) am-
biguity neutrality is prevalent while ambiguity seeking and aversion are observed in roughly
the same proportions and; (5) there is no correlation between risk and ambiguity attitudes.
Our results provide support to those theories that promote the idea of sophistication and
therefore, reject the axiom of dynamic consistency as in Siniscalchi (2011). Then support is
provided, to a lower degree, to theories that assume naı¨ve updating (Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1993), Pires (2002), Eichberger et al. (2007), Eichberger et al. (2010)) and very little evidence
is provided in favour of theories that assume dynamic consistency (Epstein and Schneider
(2003), Klibanoff et al. (2009)). The importance of the above needs to be highlighted for two
reasons. Recent empirical research in dynamic financial decision making based on field data52,
models behaviour by implicitly assuming dynamic consistency (the model that the minority of
our subjects comply with) whereas, recent theoretical studies on dynamic asset markets under
ambiguity53, assume heterogeneity in planning strategies and behaviour. Hence, accounting
for heterogeneity could potentially provide better insights of how people actually behave in
dynamic, ambiguous environments, fact that calls for further empirical investigation. Our pa-
per is a first step towards studying behavioural heterogeneity regarding planning strategies in
dynamic environments under ambiguity. Extensions are needed in order to capture behaviour
in more complicated environments that include different representations of ambiguity (e.g.
natural events), longer time horizons, effects of social interaction or connect it with the decision
from experience literature54 as well as with the time preferences literature.
52See Thimme and Vo¨lkert (2015), Jeong et al. (2015).
53See Easley and O’ Hara (2009), Mele and Sangiorgi (2015).
54See Ert and Trautmann (2014).
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Table 1: Prior beliefs in the MMT
pi pi(R) pi(B) pi(Y)
A 1− pi(B)− pi(Y) pi(B) pi(Y)
B pi(R) 1− pi(R)− pi(Y) pi(Y)
C pi(R) pi(B) 1− pi(R)− pi(B)
Table 2: Average values of goodness of fit
Type LL AIC BIC
SEU -451.06 910.11 921.26
(108.49) (216.99) (216.99)
Resolute -448.31 908.62 925.35
(108.07) (216.14) (216.14)
Naı¨ve -446.91 905.81 922.54
(108.6) (217.21) (217.21)
Sophisticated -444.04 900.08 916.80
(107.5) (214.99) (214.99)
Obs 58 58 58
Table 3: Classification based on goodness of fit
Type LL AIC BIC
SEU 0 16 31
% (0) (0.28) (0.53)
Resolute 14 10 6
% (0.24) (0.17) (0.10)
Naı¨ve 15 12 7
% (0.26) (0.21) (0.12)
Sophisticated 29 20 14
% (0.50) (0.34) (0.24)
Total 58 58 58
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from SEU at 1%
Significantly different
from SEU at 5%
SEU 0 31 27
Resolute 14 6 7
Naı¨ve 15 7 8
Sophisticated 29 14 16
Non-EU 58 27 31
Total 58 58 58
Table 5: Summary of Estimates
Parameter SEU Resolute Nave Sophisticated
piB
Mean 0.279 0.255 0.242 0.225
Median 0.295 0.283 0.272 0.257
St. Dev (0.084) (0.092) (0.107) (0.104)
piY
Mean 0.372 0.347 0.335 0.337
Median 0.357 0.338 0.334 0.339
St. Dev (0.068) (0.058) (0.081) (0.102)
piR
Mean 0.348 0.321 0.298 0.329
Median 0.335 0.324 0.317 0.320
St. Dev (0.07) (0.087) (0.107) (0.082)
r
Mean 1.486 1.428 1.422 1.268
Median 0.882 0.841 0.849 0.915
St. Dev (1.94) (2.021) (1.966) (1.596)
a
Mean - 0.437 0.491 0.527
Median - 0.208 0.475 0.530
St. Dev - 0.411 0.408 0.379
s
Mean 31.854 32.187 32.557 32.783
Median 15.773 15.816 15.370 16.370
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